A century after the fact, we have to reflect on the German beginning of unrestricted submarine warfare on 18 February 1915, and the British official release of the Zimmerman Telegram text to the United States on 23 February 1917 two years and five days later than little more than a coincidence. At the time it was little remarked on, but still it gives pause, and raises a question: what joins these two events?
The answer is American relations with Germany.
By the end of 1914, German planners realized their earlier calculations for army planning and fleet building were based on gross miscalculations. The army was too small to fight France (and its colonies), Russia and the British Empire all at once. With Belgium added, the ground manpower advantage was nearly 3:1 against Germany. Their long-dead architect of the "beat France, then Russia" motto of German strategic thinking, Alfred Von Schlieffen, would have been aghast at Helmuth von Molke's dilution of the first offensives of 1914. But, a strong British Expeditionary Force (BEF) at the frontiers had been, in his time, impossible to predict.
He would have been even more surprised that someone tried to use his “plans” that Germany never had the resources to implement in full.
Worse, Alfred von Tirpitz' "risk fleet" theory that kept the German fleet just large enough for Britain to worry but not (theoretically) threaten them was flawed. It depended on a Royal Navy close blockade of the European coasts, so that the occasional German sortie could thin them out. But this didn't happen. The Royal Navy would always outnumber German warships. Britain’s distant blockade of Europe, from the outset, was more effective at denying Germany vital foodstuffs and raw war materials.
While Europe could (barely) withstand a protracted war, Germany could not, either by design or by temperament.
But Britain also depended on food and raw materials from overseas. By declaring her submarines would no longer be bound by "cruiser" rules, Germany expected to warn neutrals off of carrying cargoes to Britain, and to sink enough imperial shipping to bring Britain to the conference table with more sensible demands. Though some Germans, notably Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg, also felt that such a move would antagonize the United States, the risk was worth the gain...if it worked.
Unfortunately, a lucky shot on 7 May 1915 brought forth the very worst in the Americans.
Off Old Kinsale Head, Lusitania caught a torpedo from U-20 and sank, killing over a thousand people, including over a hundred Americans. Germany had promised it would observe cruiser rules regarding the fast liners; Germany listed Lusitania in their identification books as a merchant cruiser or troopship (which she was to become had she survived).
Who was at fault here?
The American public and President Woodrow Wilson said Germany was. After the sinking of Arabic with the loss of three American lives on 15 August 1915, the German government required submarines to observe cruiser rules with all ocean liners. On 18 September, the Imperial High Seas Fleet withdrew their submarines from commerce warfare.
American rage over policies "worse than piracy" lingered…
Until Germany declared on 1 January 1917 that unrestricted submarine warfare would begin again. But shortly afterwards, the Americans and British, at about the same time, realized a German plot to involve Mexico in a war against the United States. The German Foreign Secretary, Arthur Zimmermann, transmitted a telegram to the ambassador from Germany, Heinrich von Eckardt, In it, Zimmerman mentioned a plan for Mexico to go to war against the United States, with German help, so that they could reacquire lands that the Americans had won in the Mexican War four generations before.
On 23 February 1917, the British Foreign Minister Arthur Balfour delivered the text to the American ambassador to Great Britain, Walter Page.
Some have claimed that a precursor to the National Security Agency had already intercepted the cable (sent through a diplomatic wire via New York) and was waiting for the British to say something official. In the shadowy worlds of signal intercept and wartime diplomacy, this is credible. But the reaction to the content, when released to the public on 28 February, was nothing short of astounding. Germany at first denied it, but finally admitted that the message was genuine. It had all the international credibility and validity of a treaty scribbled on a cocktail napkin: Germany and Mexico had settled on nothing. Mexico did not know of the overture and had solicited no such alliance or agreement.
But the die was cast, and the road to war for America was, from that time onward, short.
By April, war fever had taken over the American press. Congress declared war on Germany on 7 April. On 28 May, General John J. Pershing departed New York, bound for France, to form the American Expeditionary Force that would eventually hold nearly 2 million men.
Coming Up…
Missing the Memorial Day Point, Aren’t We?
The Hornet’s Nest at Shiloh: Did It Matter?
And Finally…
On 27 May:
1901: The Edison Storage Battery Company was organized in West Orange, New Jersey. Intended to manufacture and market Edison’s new alkaline batteries, the firm was a commercial success as long as the DC/AC controversy raged…until AC won out. General Electric absorbed the firm in 1930, but the building still stands as a museum.
1941: Battleship Bismarck sank in the Bay of Biscay after a seven-day pursuit and an hour long battering by two RN battleships. Like the rest of the Third Reich’s battle-fleet, the designers intended Bismarck as a commerce raider, not a warship killer. Therefore, many regard her sinking of HMS Hood as a fluke.
And today is NATIONAL CELLOPHANE TAPE DAY, to honor the first patent on cellophane tape awarded on this date in 1930. In the grips of a Depression…cellophane tape…