The cost assymetry you higlighted is the Pentagon's worst nightmre. When a $20,000 Shahad can force a $1.35 billion defensive response, the economic calculus of warfare fundmentally shifts. The transition from exquisite Predators to comercial quadcopters represents more than technology change, it's a complete restructring of military thinking that challenges every procurement assumption made over the past three decades.
Only three decades? More like six. Let's recall the Bradley, meant to be a USAF ground defense vehicle that became a lightly armored Army tank at ten times the initial cost that made itself more target than asset. Or the Davey Crockett antiaircraft system that, five years behind schedule, got cancelled because it could only acquire outhouse fans. My current fave is the LCS, a weapons system no one wanted that doesn't do any mission right except sit pier-side sucking up money,
I could go on, and I have, but you get it. Pentagon acquisitions have been screwed up since McNamara got in.
The cost assymetry you higlighted is the Pentagon's worst nightmre. When a $20,000 Shahad can force a $1.35 billion defensive response, the economic calculus of warfare fundmentally shifts. The transition from exquisite Predators to comercial quadcopters represents more than technology change, it's a complete restructring of military thinking that challenges every procurement assumption made over the past three decades.
Only three decades? More like six. Let's recall the Bradley, meant to be a USAF ground defense vehicle that became a lightly armored Army tank at ten times the initial cost that made itself more target than asset. Or the Davey Crockett antiaircraft system that, five years behind schedule, got cancelled because it could only acquire outhouse fans. My current fave is the LCS, a weapons system no one wanted that doesn't do any mission right except sit pier-side sucking up money,
I could go on, and I have, but you get it. Pentagon acquisitions have been screwed up since McNamara got in.